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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2496
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001163

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SUBJECT: NEPAL: PRIME MINISTER'S BRIEFING FOR P-5
REPRESENTATIVES

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Randy W. Berry. Reasons 1.4 (b/
d).

11. (C) Summary: Prime Minister M.K. Nepal, flanked by his two Deputy Prime Ministers, told P-5 Ambassadors and Charges that the country was currently facing &new challenges⁸ to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. On the heels of a three-day Maoist bandh,, or general strike, he expressed GON frustration that the Maoists have failed to renounce violence and had resorted to undemocratic actions to further their political agenda. While complaining that UNMIN has become &too biased, too partial,⁸ he indicated that Cabinet would likely request a limited extension of mandate (as little as four months, to coincide with the planned completion of the new constitution on May 28, 2010) to focus only on arms monitoring. The PM also laid out six reasonable &key issues⁸ that the GON would like to see the Maoists address, and vowed that the Government was prepared to engage with the Maoists) even bringing them into Government) but not as its leader. The PM spelled out the need for action on the integration/rehabilitation of Maoist combatants, saying that a new constitution cannot be promulgated while the &Maoist Army⁸ remains intact and in cantonments) and acknowledged that he and Maoist leader Dahal had agreed that between 4,000-6,000 combatants would be integrated into the Nepal Army - eventually. End Summary.

12. (C) Prime Minister M.K. Nepal summoned P-5 Ambassadors and Charges to a peace process briefing on December 23. The Prime Minister was joined by First Deputy Prime Minister Bijay Gachchhadar (Madheshi Janakdar Forum), Second Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sujata Koirala (Nepali Congress), Minister for Federal Affairs Minendra Rizal (Nepali Congress), Chief Cabinet Secretary Madhav Ghimire, Foreign Secretary Madan Bhattarai, and the Prime Minister,s advisor, Rajan Bhattarai. Charge Berry, along with the British, French, and Russian Ambassadors attended, as did the Chinese Charge.

Concern Over &New Challenges⁸

13. (C) Speaking from prepared notes, the PM reiterated the GON,s support for full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but noted that progress was being hampered by &new challenges,⁸ mainly in the form of increasing Maoist intransigence. The PM complained that despite attempts to engage the Maoists, they continued to use and

espouse violence as a means of advancing their party agenda. He noted with special concern the situation in the cantonments, where Maoists combatants still reside. Maoist leadership had not been helpful in bringing the combatants under the control of the Special Committee, as required. He stressed that a solution on the reintegration/rehabilitation must be completed before the new constitution could be promulgated (now slated for May 28, 2010). Instead of working on such issues, the PM said, the Maoists continued to provide only endless protests, abductions, killings, extortion, and land seizures.⁸ He lightly chided some members of the diplomatic community⁸ (read: EU Member states, to varying degrees) of failing to hold the Maoists accountable for such actions. The GON wants the Maoists to engage in a constructive and productive manner. He had done his utmost, the PM said, to ensure that they have the opportunity to rejoin government) but that he would not consent to them leading a new, unity government.

Six Items

14. (C) The PM said that the GON remained willing to engage, and was asking the Maoists to address six issues/items to bring them back into the process, including:

- A categorical renunciation of the use or threat of violence;
- A clear acceptance/participation in a peaceful, multiparty democratic system;
- To complete the task of combatant management,⁸ i.e. reach a deal on rehabilitation/reintegration;

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- Cease unilateral declarations of autonomous states and other undemocratic actions;
- Fully respect freedom of speech and of the media;
- Halt trade union and youth wing excesses that contribute to the environment of distrust.

UNMIN

15. (C) The PM complained that after playing a constructive role, UNMIN of late had become too biased and partial to play as constructive a role in Nepal as he had hoped. Despite this unhappiness (particularly the most recent Secretary-General report that called for a national unity government in Nepal), he confirmed that he would recommend that the Cabinet approve a single, limited, and final request for an extension of UNMIN's mandate to last three or four months.⁸ He ruled out any broadening of UNMIN's mandate to include political matters. UNMIN could play an effective role in supporting the rehabilitation/reintegration process through its arms monitoring function, but should limit itself to that activity. He suggested that in a December 22 meeting with Maoist leader Dahal (Prachanda), they both agreed that decisions leading to reintegration/rehabilitation could be taken quickly, and (unrealistically, to our view) be completed by the end of May 2010. The PM indicated that the GON could provide, as an annex to their mandate extension request, a more specific, measurable timeline on steps to integration.

Comment

16. (C) The PM's comments were more organized and clearly presented than usual; it was also significant that he had included other senior Ministers in this briefing to demonstrate agreement among the big three⁸ (UML, NC, and the Gachchhadar faction of the MJF) of his coalition government. The tone was reasoned; the six points enumerated by the PM also appear reasonable and constructive.

His points on the need to address rehabilitation/reintegration are valid, though the timeline to do so seems fairly unrealistic to us due to the current low levels of trust and flexibility by any of the parties. The GON's probable stance on UNMIN's extension is not surprising, and tracks with all other previous indications that the governing parties (and presumably the Government of

India) would like to see UNMIN heading for the door. Despite the current environment, it is an encouraging sign that the PM and Maoist leader Dahal continue to meet, and discuss the way forward in some detail. That continued conversation, along with recent Maoist unilateral (and positive) moves to demobilize the 4,000 disqualified combatants from the cantonments (last week) and suspend its obstruction of Parliament (yesterday), are positive signs in the midst of the impasse.

BERRY